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1 Introduction21
Two important challenges in program verification are state-space explosion and the environ-22
ment problem. The former refers to the need to investigate infeasibly many states, while the23
latter concerns cases where the code depends on an environment that is not available for24
analysis. State-space explosion has been approached with a range of techniques, which have25
led to verification tools being nowadays routinely used on industrial-scale code (e.g. [10, 5, 7]).26
The environment problem, however, remains largely unanswered: verification techniques27
often require the whole code to be present for the analysis and, in particular, cannot analyse28
components like libraries where parts of the code are missing (e.g. the client using the library).29
This problem is particularly acute in higher-order programs, where the interaction between a30
program and its environment can be intricate and e.g. involve callbacks or reentrant calls. In31
this paper we address this latter problem by combining game semantics, a semantics theory32
for higher-order programs, with symbolic execution, a technique that uses symbolic values to33
explore multiple execution paths of a program.34
To showcase the importance and challenges of the environment problem, following is a35
1 import send:(int → unit)
2 int balance := 100;
3
4 public withdraw (m:int) :(unit) =
5 if (not (! balance < m)) then
6 send(m);
7 balance := !balance - m;
8 assert(not(! balance < 0))
9 else ();
simple example of a library written in a sug-36
ared version of HOLi, the vehicle language37
of this paper. The example is a simpli-38
fied implementation of “The DAO” smart39
contract, a failed decentralised autonomous40
organisation on the Ethereum blockchain41
platform [12]. As with libraries, the chal-42
lenge in analysing smart contracts is that43
the client code is not available. We must44
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thus generate all possible contexts in which the contract can be called. In this case, the error45
is caused by a reentrant call from the send() method, which is provided by the environment.46
When this method is called, the environment takes control and is allowed to call any method47
in the library. If a client were to call withdraw() within its send() method, the recursive48
call would drain all the funds available, which is simulated in this example by a negative49
balance. This happens because the method is manipulating a global state, and is updating50
it after the external call. We can see that an analysis capturing this error would need to51
be able to predict an intricate environment behaviour. Moreover, such an analysis should52
ideally only predict realisable environment behaviours.53
Symbolic execution [34, 13, 19] explores all paths of a program using symbolic values54
instead of concrete input values. Each symbolic path holds a path condition (a SAT formula)55
that is satisfiable if and only if the path can be concretely executed. While the resulting56
analysis is unbounded in general, by restricting our focus to bounded paths we can soundly57
catch errors, or affirm the absence thereof up to the used bound. Game semantics [2, 14],58
on the other hand, models higher-order program phrases in isolation as 2-player games:59
sequences of computational moves (method calls and returns) between the program and60
its hypothetical environment. The power of the technique lies in its use of combinatorial61
conditions to precisely allow those game plays that can be realised by including the program62
in an actual environment. Moreover, the theory can be formulated operationally in terms63
of a trace semantics for open terms [18, 21, 16] which, in turn, lends itself to a symbolic64
representation. The latter yields a symbolic execution technique that is sound and complete65
in the following sense: given an open program, its symbolic traces match its concrete traces,66
which match its realisable traces in some environment.67
Returning to the DAO example, we can model the ensuing interaction as a sequence of68
moves, alternating between the environment and the library. Any finite sequence of moves69
(that leads to an assertion violation) is a trace defining a counterexample. Running the70
example in HOLiK, our implementation of the symbolic semantics in the K Framework [33],71
the following minimal symbolic trace is automatically found:72
73 call〈withdraw, x1〉 · call〈send, x1〉 · call〈withdraw, x2〉74
· call〈send, x2〉 · ret〈send, ()〉 · ret〈withdraw, ()〉 · ret〈send, ()〉75677
where x1 is the original call parameter, and x2 is the parameter for the reentrant call,78
satisfiable with values x1 = 100 and x2 = 1. A fix would be to swap line 6 and 7, to update79
internal state before passing control.80
In Appendix A we look at a few more examples of libraries that exhibit errors due to81
high-order behaviours. We provide three examples: a file lock example, a double deallocation82
example, and an unsafe implementation of flat-combining.83
Overall, this paper contributes a novel symbolic execution technique based on game84
semantics to precisely model the behaviour of higher-order stateful programs. Specifically:85
We present a symbolic trace semantics for higher-order libraries that captures the behaviour86
of an unknown environment, and prove it sound and complete: i.e. it produces no spurious87
error traces, and is able to produce the complete execution tree of any library. By88
bounding the depth of nested calls and the insistence of the environment in calling library89
methods, we derive a sound and bounded-complete technique to check higher-order libraries90
for errors. We implement the latter in the K semantical framework [33] to produce a91
sound and bounded-complete tool for higher-order libraries as a proof of concept. We test92
our implementation with benchmarks adapted from the literature. Some material has been93
delegated to an Appendix. Full proofs can be found in an extended version of the paper [22].94
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Libraries L ::= B | abstract m;L
Blocks B ::= ε | public m = λx.M ;B
| m = λx.M ;B | global r := i;B
| global r := λx.M ;B
Clients C ::= L; main = M
Terms M ::= m | i | () | x | λx.M | r := M | !r
|M ⊕M | 〈M,M〉 | pi1M | pi2M
|MM | if M then M else M
| letrec x = λx.M in M
| let x = M in M | assert(M)
() : unit i : int
x ∈ Varsθ
x : θ
m ∈ Methsθ,θ′
m : θ → θ′
M,M ′ : int
M ⊕M ′ : int
M : int M1,M0 : θ
if M then M1 else M0 : θ
M : θ1 M ′ : θ2
〈M,M ′〉 : θ1 × θ2
〈M,M ′〉 : θ1 × θ2
pii〈M,M ′〉 : θi
r ∈ Refsθ
!r : θ
r ∈ Refsθ M : θ
r := M : unit
M ′ : θ → θ′ M : θ
M ′M : θ′
M : θ′ x : θ
λx.M : θ → θ′
x,M : θ M ′ : θ′
let x = M in M ′ : θ′
x, λy.M : θ → θ′′ M ′ : θ′
letrec x = λy.M in M ′ : θ′
M : int
assert(M) : unit
Figure 1 Syntax and typing rules of HOLi.
2 A Language for Higher-Order Libraries: HOLi95
We introduce HOLi, a language for higher-order libraries which define methods to be used96
by an external client, and in turn require external methods (provided by the client). We97
give in HOLi an operational semantics for terms that integrates a counter for the depth of98
nested calls that a program phrase can make. We then extend this counting semantics to99
open terms by means of a trace semantics. We show that the trace semantics of libraries is100
sound and complete for reachability of errors under any external client.101
2.1 Syntax and operational semantics102
A library in HOLi is a collection of typed higher-order methods. A client is simply a library103
with a main body. Types are given by the grammar:104
θ ::= unit | int | θ × θ | θ → θ105
We use countably infinite sets Meths, Refs and Vars for method, global reference and106
variable names, ranged over by m, r and x respectively, and variants thereof; while i is for107
ranging over the integers. We use ⊕ to range over a set of binary integer operations, which108
we leave unspecified. Each set of names is typed, that is, it can be expressed as a disjoint109
union as follows: Meths =
⊎
θ,θ′ Methsθ,θ′ , Refs =
⊎
θ 6=θ1×θ2 Refsθ, Vars =
⊎
θ Varsθ.110
The full syntax and typing rules are given in Figure 1. Thus, a library consists of111
abstract method declarations, followed by blocks of public and private method and reference112
definitions. A method is considered private unless it is declared public. Each public/private113
method and reference is defined once. Abstract methods are not given definitions: these114
methods are external to the library. Public, private and abstract methods are all disjoint.115
Libraries are well typed if all their method and reference definitions are well typed (e.g.116
public m = λx.M is well typed if m : θ and λx.M : θ are both valid for the same type θ)117
and only mention methods and references that are defined or abstract. A client L; main = M118
is well typed if M : unit is valid and L; m = λx.M is well typed for some fresh x,m. A119
library/client is open if it contains abstract methods. This is different to open/closed terms:120
we call a term open if it contains free variables.121
I Remark 1. By typing variable, reference and method names, we do not need to provide a122
context in typing judgements. Note that the references we use are of non-product type and,123
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(E[let x = v in M ], R, S, k)→ (E[M{v/x}], R, S, k) (E[pij〈v1, v2〉], R, S, k)→ (E[vj ], R, S, k)
(E[r := v], R, S, k)→ (E[()], R, S[r 7→ v], k) (E[!r], R, S, k)→ (E[S(r)], R, S, k)
(E[if i then M1 else M0], R, S, k)→ (E[Mj ], R, S, k) (1) (E[i1 ⊕ i2], R, S, k)→ (E[i], R, S, k) (2)
(E[λx.M ], R, S, k)→ (E[m], R unionmulti {m 7→ λx.M}, S, k) (E[assert(i)], R, S, k)→ (E[()], R, S, k) (3)
(E[mv], R, S, k)→ (E[LM{v/x}M], R, S, k + 1) (4) (E[LvM], R, S, k + 1)→ (E[v], R, S, k)
(E[letrec f = λx.M in M ′], R, S, k)→ (E[M ′{m/f}], R unionmulti {m 7→ λx.M{m/f}}, S, k)
Conditions: (1) : j = 1 iff i 6= 0, (2) : i = i1 ⊕ i2, (3) : i 6= 0, (4) : R(m) = λx.M.
Values v ::= m | i | () | 〈v, v〉 Terms (extended) M ::= · · · | LMM
Eval.Contexts E ::= • | assert(E) | r := E | E ⊕M | v ⊕ E | 〈E,M〉 | 〈v,E〉 | pijE
EM | mE | let x = E in M | if E then M else M | LEM
(abstract m;L,R, S,P,A) bld−−→ (L,R, S,P,A unionmulti {m})
(public m = λx.M ;B,R, S,P,A) bld−−→ (B,R unionmulti {m 7→ λx.M}, S,P unionmulti {m},A)
(m = λx.M ;B,R, S,P,A) bld−−→ (B,R unionmulti {m 7→ λx.M}, S,P,A)
(global r := i;B,R, S,P,A) bld−−→ (B,R, S unionmulti {r 7→ i},P,A)
(global r := λx.M ;B,R, S,P,A) bld−−→ (B,R unionmulti {m 7→ λx.M}, S unionmulti {r 7→ m},P,A)
Figure 2 Operational semantics (top); values and evaluation contexts (mid); library build (bottom).
more importantly, global to the library: a term can use references but not create them locally124
or pass them as arguments (we discuss how to include such references in Appendix C).125
I Example 2. The DAO-attack example from the Introduction can be written in HOLi as:126
abstract send; global bal := 100;127
public wdraw =128
λx. if !bal ≥ x then (send(x); bal := !bal − x; assert(!bal ≥ 0)) else ()129
130
where send,wdraw ∈ Methsint,unit, bal ∈ Refsint, and M ;M ′ stands for let = M in M ′.131
A library contains public methods that can be called by a client. On the other hand,132
a client contains a main body that can be executed. These two scenarios constitute the133
operational semantics of HOLi. Both are based on evaluating (closed) terms, which we134
define next. Term evaluation requires: the closed term being evaluated; method definitions,135
provided by a method repository; reference values, provided by a store; and a call-depth136
counter (a natural number). Since method application is the only source of infinite behaviour137
in HOLi, bounding the depth of nested calls is enough to guarantee termination in program138
analysis. Hence we provide a mechanism to keep track of call depth.139
The operational semantics is given in Figure 2. The evaluation of terms (top part) involves140
configurations of the form (M,R, S, k), where:141
M is a closed term which may contain evaluation boxes, i.e. points inside a term where142
a method call has been made and has not yet returned, and is taken from the syntax143
extending the one of Figure 1 with the rule: M ::= · · · | LMM144
R is a method repository, i.e. a partial map from method names to their bodies145
S is a store, i.e. a partial map from reference names to their stored values146
k is a counter, i.e. a natural number.147
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Most of the rules are standard, but it is worth noting that lambdas are not values themselves148
but, rather, evaluate to method names that are freshly stored in the repository. Moreover,149
evaluation boxes interplay with the counter k in the semantics: they mark places where the150
depth has increased because of a nested call. The penultimate line of rules in the operational151
semantics keeps track of call depth, and illustrates the utility of evaluation boxes: making152
a call increases the counter and leaves behind an evaluation box; returning form the call153
removes the box and decreases the counter again.154
A library L builds into a configuration of the form (ε,R, S,P,A), which includes its155
public methods according to the rules in Figure 2 (bottom). More precisely, R and S are as156
above, while P,A ⊆ Meths are (disjoint) sets of public and abstract method names. We say157
that (a well typed) L builds to (ε,R, S,P,A) if (L, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅) bld−−→
∗
(ε,R, S,P,A). If L builds158
to (ε,R, S,P,A) then the client L; main = M builds to (M,R, S,P,A). Moreover, we can159
link libraries to clients and evaluate them, as in the following definition.160
I Definition 3. 1. Library L and client C are compiatible if L builds to some (ε,R, S,P,A)161
and C builds to some (M,R′, S′,P ′,A′) such that: P ⊇ A′ and A ⊇ P ′ ( complementation);162
dom(S)∩dom(S′) = ∅ ( disjoint state); and dom(R)∩dom(R′) = ∅ ( method ownership).163
2. For a library L, we let Lˆ be L with all its abstract method declarations and public164
keywords removed; and similarly for Cˆ. Given compatible library L and client C, we let165
their composition be the client: L;C = Lˆ; Cˆ.166
3. Given compatible L,C, the semantics of L;C is:167
JL;CK = {ρ | L;C builds to (M,R, S, ∅, ∅) ∧ (M,R, S, 0)→∗ ρ}168
We say that JL;CK fails if it contains some (E[assert(0)], · · · ).169
I Example 4. To illustrate how libraries and clients are used, consider the DAO example170
again as a library LDAO. We can define a client Catk:171
abstract wdraw; global wlet := 0;172
public send = λx.wlet := !wlet+ x; if !wlet < 100 then wdraw(x) else ();173
main = wdraw(1)174
175
to produce the following linked client LDAO;Catk (modulo re-ordering):176
global bal := 100; global wlet := 0;177
wdraw = λx. if !bal ≥ x then (send(x); bal := !bal − x; assert(!bal > 0)) else ();178
public send = λx.wlet := !wlet+ x; if !wlet < 100 then wdraw(x) else ();179
main = wdraw(1)180
181
We can see how LDAO is vulnerable to an attacker such as Catk after linking them. The aim is182
thus to use bounded analysis to find counterexamples that define clients such as this one.183
2.2 Trace Semantics184
The semantics we defined only allows us to evaluate terms, and only so long as their method185
applications only involve methods that can be found in the repository R. We next extend186
this semantics to encompass libraries and terms that can also call abstract methods. The187
approach we follow is based on operational game semantics [18, 21, 16] and in particular the188
semantics is given by means of traces of method calls and returns (called moves in game189
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(INT)
(M,R, S, k)→ (M ′, R′, S′, k′)
(E ,M,R, S,P,A, k)p → (E ,M ′, R′, S′,P,A, k′)p
(PQ) (E , E[mv], R, S,P,A, k)p call(m,v)−−−−−−→ ((m,E) :: E , 0, R, S,P ′,A, k)o
(OQ) (E , l, R, S,P,A, k)o call(m,v)−−−−−−→ ((m, l + 1) :: E ,mv,R, S,P,A′, k)p if R(m) = λx.M
(PA) ((m, l) :: E , v, R, S,P,A, k)p ret(m,v)−−−−−→ (E , l, R, S,P ′,A, k)o
(OA) ((m,E) :: E , l, R, S,P,A, k)o ret(m,v)−−−−−→ (E , E[v], R,P,A′, k)p
(PC) : m ∈ A∧P ′ = P ∪ (Meths(v) ∩ dom(R)), (OC) : m ∈ P ∧A′ = A∪ (Meths(v) \ dom(R)).
Figure 3 Trace semantics rules. Rules (PQ), (PA) assume the condition (PC), and similarly for
(OQ),(OA) and (OC). Meths(v) contains all method names appearing in v. INT stands for internal
transition; PQ for P -question (i.e. call); PA for P -answer (i.e. return). Similarly for OQ and OA.
semantics jargon), between the library and its client. In between such moves, the semantics190
evolves as the operational semantics we already saw.191
To maintain a terminating analysis, we need to keep track of an added source of infinite192
execution, namely endless consecutive calls from an external component: a library will never193
terminate if its client keeps calling its methods. This leads us to a semantics with two194
counters, k and l, where k keeps track of internal nested method calls and l records the195
number of consecutive calls made from the external component. This counter l is orthogonal196
to k and is refreshed at every call to the external context.197
When computing the semantics of a library, the library and its methods are the Player (P)198
of the computation game, while the (intended) client is the Opponent (O). As the semantics199
is given in absence of an actual client, O actually represents every possible client. When200
computing the semantics of a client, the roles are reversed. In both cases, though, the same201
sets of rules is used and there is no need to specify who is P and O in the semantics.202
The trace semantics uses game configurations, which are divided into P -configurations203
and O-configurations given respectively as:204
(E ,M,R, S,P,A, k)p and (E , l, R, S,P,A, k)o .205
In a P -configuration, a term M is being evaluated – this is P ’s role. In an O-configuration,206
an external call has been made and the semantics waits for O to either return that call, or207
reply itself with another call. The components M,R, S,P,A, k, l are as above, while E is an208
evaluation stack :209
E ::= ε | (m,E) :: E | (m, l) :: E210
which keeps track of the computations that are on hold due to external calls. The trace211
semantics is generated by the rules given in Figure 3.212
The formulation follows closely the operational game semantics technique. For example,213
from a P -configuration (E ,M,R, S,P,A, k)p, there are 3 options:214
1. If M can make an internal reduction, i.e. in the operational semantics in context (R,S, k),215
then (E ,M,R, S,P,A, k)p performs this reduction (via (INT)).216
2. If M is stuck at a method application for a method that is not in the repository R, then217
that method must be abstract (i.e. external) and needs to be called externally. This is218
achieved be issuing a call move and moving to an O-configuration (via (PQ)). The current219
evaluation context and the called method name are stored, in order to resume once the220
call is returned (via (OA)).221
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3. If M is a value and the evaluation stack is non-empty, then P has completed a method222
call that was issued by O (via (OQ)) and can now return (via (PA)).223
On the other hand, from an O-configuration (E , l, R, S,P,A, k)o, there are 2 options:224
1. either return the last open method call (made by P ) via (OA), or225
2. call one of the public methods (from P) using (OQ).226
The role of conditions (PC) and (OC) is to ensure that each player calls the methods227
owned by the other, or returns their own, and update the sets of public and abstract names228
according to the method names passed inside v.229
I Remark 5. The novelty of Figure 3 with respect to previous work on trace semantics for230
open libraries (e.g. [26]) lies in the use of l in order to bound the ability of O to ask repeated231
questions for finite analysis. The way rules (OQ) and (PA) are designed is such that any232
sequence of consecutive O-calls and P -returns has maximum length 2n if we bound l to n233
(i.e. l ≤ n), as each such pair of moves increases l by 1. On the other hand, each P -call234
supplies to O a fresh counter (l = 0) to be used in contiguous (OQ)-(PA)’s. Thus, l can be235
seen as keeping track of the insistence of O in calling.236
Finally, we can define the trace semantics of libraries.237
I Definition 6. Let L be a library. The semantics of L is :238
JLK = {(τ, ρ) | (L, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅) bld−−→∗ (ε,R, S,P,A) ∧ (ε, 0, R, S,P,A, 0)o τ−→ ρ}239240
We say that JLK fails if it contains some (τ, (E , E[assert(0)], · · · )).241
I Example 7. Consider the DAO example as library LDAO once again. Evaluating the game242
semantics we know the following sequence is in JLDAOK. For economy, we hide R,P,A and243
show only the top of the stack in the configurations. We also use m(v)? and m(v)! for calls244
and returns. We write Si for the store [bal 7→ i].245
(ε, 0, S100, 0)o
wdraw(42)?−−−−−−−→ ((wdraw, 1), wdraw(42), S100, 0)p246
−→∗ ((wdraw, 1), E[send(42)], S100, 1)p send(42)?−−−−−−→ ((send,E), 2, S100, 1)o247
wdraw(100)?−−−−−−−−→ ((wdraw, 1), wdraw(100), S100, 1)p248
−→∗ ((wdraw, 1), E′[send(100)], S100, 2)p send(100)?−−−−−−−→ ((send,E), 2, S100, 2)o249
send(())!−−−−−−→ ((wdraw, 1), E′[()], S100, 2)p −→∗ ((wdraw, 1), (), S0, 2)p250
wdraw(())!−−−−−−−→ ((send,E), 1, S0, 2)o send(())!−−−−−−→ ((wdraw, 1), E[()], S0, 1)p251
−→∗ ((wdraw, 1), E[assert(−42 ≥ 0)], S−42, 1)p252253
This transition sequence is an instance of the symbolic trace provided in the Introduction.254
Here, a call is made with parameter 42, and a reentrant call with 100, which leads to the255
assertion violation assert(−42 ≥ 0). Note that a bound of k ≤ 2 is sufficient to find this256
assertion violation.257
We next establish two focal properties of the trace semantics: bounding k and l ensures258
termination (Theorem 8), and that it is sound and complete with respect to library errors259
(Theorem 9). Notice Theorem 9 captures both soundness and completeness as it states that260
the game semantics eventually reaches every error that is concretely reachable for any client261
while finding only errors that can be reached concretely by a definable client.262
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I Theorem 8 (Boundedness). For any game configuration ρ, provided an upper bound k0263
and l0 for call counters k and l, the labelled transition system starting from ρ is strongly264
normalising.265
Proof. For any transition sequence ρ = ρ0 → · · · → ρi → . . . and each i > 0, we set the266
following two classes of configurations:267
(A) = {ρi | |ρi| < |ρi−1|} (B) = {ρi | ∃j < i− 1. |ρi| < |ρj |}268
where |ρ| = (k0 − k, |M |, l0 − l) is the size of ρ, and |ρ| < |ρ′| is defined by the lexicographic269
ordering of the triple (k0 − k, |M |, l0 − l), with bounds k0 and l0 such that k ≤ k0 and l ≤ l0270
for semantic transitions to be applicable. If not present in the configuration, we look at271
the evaluation stack E to find the top-most missing component. In other words, opponent272
configurations will have size (k0 − k, |E|, l0 − l) where E is the top-most one in E , whereas273
proponent configurations will have size (k0 − k, |M |, l0 − l) where l is the top-most one in E .274
We approach the proof in two steps: (1) we show that, for any transition sequence out of275
ρ, each reachable configuration belongs to (at least) one of the above classes; and (2) prove276
that the classes form a terminating sequence. For (1), considering all moves available to ρ,277
we have the following cases.278
1. If ρ→ ρ′ is an (Int) move, we have two possibilities.279
a. For a transition (E[LvM], R, S, k)→ (E[v], R, S, k+1), where k+1 ≤ k0, we have a class280
(B) configuration since there must be a (E[mv], R, S, k) such that (E[mv], R, S, k)→∗281
(E[v], R, S, k) which is lexicographically ordered since |v| < |mv|.282
b. Every other transition sequence is class (A) since they reduce the size of the term.283
2. If ρ→ ρ′ is a (Pq) move, we have that ρ′ is a class (A) configuration since (k, |E|, l0) <284
(k, |E[mv]|, l0 − l) by lexicographic ordering.285
3. If ρ→ ρ′ is an (Oa) move, we have a transition286
((m,E) :: E , l, . . . , k)o ret(m,v)−−−−−→ (E , E[v], . . . , k)p287
which must be a result of the prior proponent question, meaning E holds an l′ on top.288
We thus have the following sequence289
(E , E[mv], . . . , k)p →∗ (E , E[v], . . . , k)o290
where (k, |E[v]|, l) < (k, |E[mv]|, l′), so ρ′ is a class (B) configuration.291
4. If ρ→ ρ′ is an (Oq) move, we have the transition292
(E , l, . . . , k)o call(m,v)−−−−−−→ ((m, l + 1) :: E ,mv, . . . , k)p293
→ ((m, l + 1) :: E , LM{v/x}M, . . . , k + 1)294
295
Simplifying the transition, we remove the configuration in between and take296
(E , l, R, S,P,A, k)o call(m,v)−−−−−−→ ((m, l + 1) :: E , LM{v/x}M, R, S,P,A, k + 1)p297
to be our new equivalent transition. We thus have that ρ′ is a class (A) configuration since298
(k0 − (k + 1), |LM{v/x}M|, l0 − (l + 1)) < (k0 − k, |E|, l0 − l) by lexicographic ordering.299
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5. If ρ→ ρ′ is a (Pa) move, we have the transition300
((m, l) :: E , v, . . . , k)p ret(m,v)−−−−−→ (E , l, . . . , k)o301
which must be the result of a prior opponent question302
(E , l + 1, . . . , k)o call(m,v)−−−−−−→ ((m, l) :: E , LM{v/x}M, . . . , k + 1)p303
→∗ ((m, l) :: E ,LvM, . . . , k + 1)p → ((m, l) :: E , v, . . . , k)p ret(m,v)−−−−−→ (E , l, . . . , k)o304305
where E′ is the topmost evaluation context in E . We thus have that (k0 − k,E′, l0 − l) <306
(k0 − k,E′, l0 − (l + 1)), so ρ′ is a class (B) configuration.307
For (2), let us assume there is an infinite sequence308
ρ0 → · · · → ρj → · · · → ρi → . . .309
Since all reachable configurations fall into either (A) or (B) class, we know that the sequence310
must comprise only (A) and (B) configurations. In this infinite sequence, we know that all311
sequences of (A) configurations are in descending size, so (A) sequences cannot be infinite.312
We also observe that (B) configurations are padded with (A) sequences. For instance, if313
ρi is a (B) configuration, and ρj is its matching configuration, there may exist nested (B)314
configurations between ρj and ρi, as well as (A) sequences padding these.315
Additionally, these (B) configurations can only occur as a return to a call, so we know316
they only occur together with the introduction of evaluation boxes L•M. Since these brackets317
occur in pairs and are introduced in a nested fashion, we know E can only contain evaluation318
contexts with well-bracketed evaluation boxes, meaning that there cannot be interleaved319
sequences of (B) configurations where their target configurations intersect. More specifically,320
the sequence321
ρ0 → · · · → ρj → · · · → ρ′j → · · · → ρi → · · · → ρ′i → . . .322
where ρ′i matches ρ
′
j and ρi matches ρj is not possible.323
Now, ignoring all (A) and nested (B) sequences, we are left with an infinite stream of324
top-level (B) sequences which are also in descending order. Since starting size is finite, we325
cannot have an infinite stream of (B) sequences. Thus, the assumption that the sequence is326
infinite does not hold, meaning our semantics is strongly normalising. J327
I Theorem 9 (S and C). We call a client good if it contains no assertions. For any library328
L, the following are equivalent:329
1. JLK fails (reaches an assertion violation)330
2. there exists a good client C such that JL;CK fails331
Proof. 1 to 2: Suppose now that (τ, ρ) ∈ JLK for some trace τ and failed ρ. By Theorem 11,332
we have that there is a good client C realising the trace τ . So then, by Lemma 10, we have333
that JL;CK fails.334
2 to 1: Suppose JL;CK fails for some good client C. Then, by Lemma 10, there are τ, ρ, ρ′335
such that (τ, ρ) ∈ JLK, (τ, ρ′) ∈ JCK, and ρ is failed (i.e. is of the shape (E , E[assert(0)], · · · )).336
J337
The latter relies on an auxiliary lemma (well-composing of libraries and clients, see [22]),338
and a definability result akin to game semantics definability arguments (see Appendix D).339
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I Lemma 10 (L-C Compositionality). For any library L and compatible good client C, JL;CK340
fails if and only if there exist (τ1, ρ1) ∈ JLK and (τ2, ρ2) ∈ JCK such that τ1 = τ2 and341
ρ1 = (E , E[assert(0)], · · · ).342
I Theorem 11 (Definability). Let L be a library and (τ, ρ) ∈ JLK. There is a good client C343
compatible with L such that (τ, ρ′) ∈ JCK for some ρ′.344
3 Symbolic Semantics345
Checking libraries for errors using the semantics of the previous section is infeasible, even when346
the traces are bounded in length, as ground values are concretely represented. In particular,347
integer values provided by O as arguments to calls or return values range over all integers.348
The typical way to mitigate this limitation is to execute the semantics symbolically, using349
symbolic variables for integers and path conditions to bind these variables to plausible values.350
We use this technique to devise a symbolic version of the trace semantics, corresponding to a351
symbolic execution which will enable us in the next sections to introduce a practical method352
and implementation for checking libraries for errors. The symbolic semantics is fully formal,353
closely following the developments of the previous section, and allows us to prove a strong354
form of correspondence between concrete and symbolic semantics (a bisimulation).355
Apart from integers, another class of concrete values provided by O are method names.356
For them, the semantics we defined is symbolic by design: all method names played by O are357
going to be fresh and therefore picking just one of those fresh choices is sufficient (formally358
speaking, the semantics lives in nominal sets [32]). The reason why using fresh names for359
methods played by O is sound is that the effect of O calling a higher-order public method360
with an argument m (where m is another public method), and with λx.mx, is equivalent as361
far as reachability of an error is concerned. In the latter case, the client semantics would362
create a fresh name m′, bind it to λx.mx, and pass m′ as an argument. We therefore just363
focus on this latter case.364
The symbolic semantics involves terms that may contain symbolic values for integers. We365
therefore extend the syntax for values and terms to include such values, and abuse notation366
by continuing to use M to range over them. We let SInts be a set of symbolic integers367
ranged over by κ and variants, and define:368
Sym.Values v˜ ::= m | i | () | κ | v˜ ⊕ v˜ | 〈v˜, v˜〉369
Sym.Terms M ::= · · · | κ370
371
where, in v˜ ⊕ v˜, not both v˜ can be integers. We moreover use a symbolic environment to372
store symbolic values for references, but also to keep track of arithmetic performed with373
symbolic integers. More precisely, we let σ be a finite partial map from the set SInts ∪ Refs374
to symbolic values. Finally, we use pc to range over program conditions, which will be375
quantifier-free first-order formulas with variables taken from SInts, and with >,⊥ denoting376
true and false respectively.377
The semantics for closed symbolic terms involves configurations of the form (M,R, σ, pc, k).378
Its rules include copies of those from Figure 2 (top) where the pc and σ are simply carried379
over. For example:380
(E[λx.M ], R, σ, pc, k)→s (E[m], R unionmulti {m 7→ λx.M}, σ, pc, k)381
where m is fresh. On the other hand, the following rules directly involve symbolic reasoning:382
(E[assert(κ)], R, σ, pc, k)→s (E[assert(0)], σ, pc ∧ (κ = 0), k)383
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(I˜NT)
(M,R, σ, pc, k)→s (M ′, R′, σ, pc′, k′)
(E ,M,R,P,A, σ, pc, k)p →s (E ,M ′, R′,P,A, σ′, pc′, k′)p
(P˜Q) (E , E[mv˜], R,P,A, σ, pc, k)p call(m,v˜)−−−−−−→s ((m,E) :: E , 0, R,P ′,A, σ, k)o
(O˜Q) (E , l, R,P,A, σ, pc, k)o call(m,v˜)−−−−−−→s ((m, l + 1) :: E ,mv˜, R,P,A′, σ, pc, k)p
(P˜A) ((m, l) :: E , v˜, R,P,A, σ, pc, k)p ret(m,v˜)−−−−−→s (E , l, R,P ′,A, σ, pc, k)o
(O˜A) ((m,E) :: E , l, R,P,A, σ, pc, k)o ret(m,v˜)−−−−−→s (E , E[v˜], R,P,A′, σ, pc, k)p
(P˜C) m ∈ A and P ′ = P ∪ (Meths(v˜) ∩ dom(R)).
(O˜C) m ∈ P and (v˜′,A′) ∈ symval(θ,A) where θ is the expected type of v˜. Moreover:
symval(θ,A) =

{((),A)} if θ = unit
{(κ,A unionmulti {κ}) | κ is fresh in dom(σ) unionmulti A} if θ = int
{(m,A unionmulti {m}) | m is fresh in dom(R) unionmulti A} if θ = θ1 → θ2
{(〈v˜1, v˜2〉,A2) | (v˜1,A1) ∈ symval(θ1,A) if θ = θ1 × θ2
(v˜2,A2) ∈ symval(θ2,A1)}
Figure 4 Symbolic trace semantics rules. Rules (P˜Q), (P˜A) assume the condition (P˜C), and
similarly for (O˜Q),(O˜A) and (O˜C). Note that (O˜Q),(O˜A) are non-deterministic as they introduce v˜.
(E[assert(κ)], R, σ, pc, k)→s (E[()], R, σ, pc ∧ (κ 6= 0), k)384
(E[!r], R, σ, pc, k)→s (E[σ(r)], R, σ, pc, k)385
(E[r := v˜], R, σ, pc, k)→s (E[()], R, σ[r 7→ v˜], pc, k)386
(E[v˜1 ⊕ v˜2], R, σ, pc, k)→s (E[κ], R, σ unionmulti {κ 7→ v˜1 ⊕ v˜2}, pc, k) where κ is fresh387
(E[if κ then M1 else M0], R, σ, pc, k)→s (E[M0], R, σ, pc ∧ (κ = 0), k)388
(E[if κ then M1 else M0], R, σ, pc, k)→s (E[M1], R, σ, pc ∧ (κ 6= 0), k)389390
and where v˜1 ⊕ v˜2 is a symbolic value (for ii ⊕ i2 the rule from Figure 1 applies).391
We now extend the symbolic setting to the trace semantics. We define symbolic configu-392
rations for P and O respectively as:393
(E ,M,R,P,A, σ, pc, k)p (E , l, R,P,A, σ, pc, k)o394
with evaluation stack E , proponent term M , counters k, l ∈ N, method repository R, public395
method name set P, σ and pc as previously. The abstract name set A is now a finite subset396
of Meths ∪ SInts, as we also need to keep track of the symbolic integers introduced by397
O (in order to be able to introduce fresh such names). The rules for the symbolic trace398
semantics are given in Figure 4. Note that O always refreshes names it passes. This is a399
sound overapproximation of all names passed for the sake of analysis.400
Similarly to Definition 6, we can define the symbolic semantics of libraries.401
I Definition 12. Given library L, the symbolic semantics of L is:402
JLKs = {(τ, ρ) |(L, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅) bld−−→∗ (ε,R, S,P,A)403
∧ (ε, 0, R,P,A, S,>, 0)o τ−→s ρ ∧ ∃M.M  ρ(σ)◦ ∧ ρ(pc)}404405
where ρ(χ) is component χ in configuration ρ, and M is a model as defined in the next406
section. We say that JLKs fails if it contains some (τ, (E , E[assert(0)], · · · )).407
The symbolic rules follow those of the concrete semantics, the biggest change being the408
treatment of symbolic values played by O. Condition (O˜C) stipulates that O plays distinct409
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fresh symbolic integers as well as fresh method names, in each appropriate position in v˜, and410
all these names are included in the set A.411
I Example 13. As with Example 7, we consider the DAO attack. Running the symbolic412
semantics, we find the following minimal class of errors. We write σv˜ for a symbolic413
environment [bal 7→ v˜].414
(ε, 2, σ100, k0)o
wdraw(κ1)?−−−−−−−−→ ((wdraw, 1), wdraw(κ1), σ100, 2)p415
−→∗ ((wdraw, 1), E[send(κ1)], σ100, 1)p send(κ1)?−−−−−−→ ((send,E), 2, σ100, 1)o416
wdraw(κ2)?−−−−−−−−→ ((wdraw, 1), wdraw(κ2), σ100, 1)p417
−→∗ ((wdraw, 1), E′[send(κ2)], σ100, 0)p send(κ2)?−−−−−−→ ((send,E), 2, σ100, 0)o418
send(())!−−−−−−→ ((wdraw, 1), E′[()], σ100, 0)p419
−→∗ ((wdraw, 1), (), σ100−κ2 , 0)p
wdraw(())!−−−−−−−→ ((send,E), 1, σ100−κ2 , 0)o420
send(())!−−−−−−→ ((wdraw, 1), E[()], σ100−κ2 , 1)p421
−→∗ ((wdraw, 1), E[assert(!bal ≥ 0)], σ100−κ2−κ1 , 1)p422423
For this to be a valid error, we require (κ1, κ2 ≤ 100) ∧ (100− κ2 − κ1 < 0) to be satisfiable.424
Taking assignment {κ1 7→ 100, κ2 7→ 1}, we show the path is valid.425
3.1 Soundness426
The main result of this section is establishing the soundness of the symbolic semantics: a427
trace and a specific configuration can be achieved symbolically iff they can be achieved428
concretely as well. In fact, we will need to quantify this statement as, by construction, the429
symbolic semantics requires O to always place fresh method names, whereas in the concrete430
semantics O is given the freedom to play old names as well. What we show is that the431
symbolic semantics corresponds (via bisimilarity) to a restriction of the concrete semantics432
where O plays fresh names only. This restriction is sound, in the sense that it is sufficient for433
identifying when a configuration can fail. We make this precise below.434
A model M is a finite partial map from symbolic integers to concrete integers. Given435
such anM and a formula φ, we defineM |= φ using a standard first-order logic interpretation436
with integers and arithmetic operators (in particular, we require that all symbolic integers in437
φ are in the domain of M). Moreover, for any symbolic term M (or trace, move, etc.), we438
denote by M{M} the concrete term we obtain by substituting any symbolic integer κ of M439
with its corresponding concrete integer M(κ). Finally, given a symbolic environment σ, we440
define its formula representation σ◦ recursively by:441
∅◦ = >, (σ unionmulti {r 7→ v})◦ = σ◦, (σ unionmulti {κ 7→ v})◦ = σ◦ ∧ (κ = v).442
We now define notions for equivalence between symbolic and concrete configurations.443
Let M be a model. For any concrete configuration ρ = (E , χ,R, S,P,A, k) and symbolic444
configuration ρs = (E ′, χ′, R′,P ′,A′, σ, pc, k′), we say they are equivalent in M, written445
ρ =M ρs, if:446
(E , χ,R) = (E ′, χ′, R′){M},P = P ′,A = A′ ∩ Meths and S = (σ  Refs){M};447
dom(M) = (A′ ∪ dom(σ)) ∩ SInts and M  pc ∧ σ◦.448
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The notion of equivalence we require between concrete configurations and their symbolic449
counterparts is behavioural equivalence, modulo O playing fresh names.450
More precisely, a transition ρ
χ−→ ρ′ is called O-refreshing if, when ρ is an O-configuration451
and χ = call/ret(m, v) then all names in v are fresh and distinct. A set R with elements452
of the form (ρ,M, ρs) is a bisimulation if, whenever (ρ,M, ρs) ∈ R, written ρRM ρs then453
ρ =M ρs and, using χ to range over moves and ε (i.e. no move):454
if ρ
χ−→ ρ′ is O-refreshing then there exists M′ ⊇ M such that ρs χs−→s ρ′s, with χ =455
χs{M′}, and ρ′RM′ρ′s;456
if ρs
χ−→s ρ′s then there exists M′ ⊇M such that ρ
χ{M′}−−−−→G ρ′ and ρ′RM′ρ′s.457
We let ∼ be the largest bisimulation relation: ρ ∼M ρs iff there is bisimulation R such that458
ρRMρs.459
We can show that concrete and symbolic configurations are bisimilar.460
I Lemma 14. Given ρ, ρs a concrete and symbolic configuration respectively, andM a model461
such that ρ =M (ρ′), we have ρ ∼M ρs.462
Proof (sketch). We show that {(ρ,M, ρ′) | ρ =M ρ′} is a bisimulation. J463
Next, we argue that O-refreshing transitions suffice for examining failure of concrete464
configurations. Indeed, suppose τ is a trace leading to fail, and where O plays an old name465
m in argument position in a given move. Then, τ can be simulated by a trace τ ′ that uses466
a fresh m′ in place of m. If m is an O-name, we obtain τ ′ from τ by following exactly the467
same transitions, only that some P -calls to m are replaced by calls to m′ (and accordingly468
for returns). If, on the other hand, m is a P -name, then the simulation performed by τ ′469
is somewhat more elaborate: some internal calls to m will be replaced by P -calls to m′,470
immediately followed by the required calls to m (and dually for returns).471
I Lemma 15 (O-Refreshing). Let ρ be a concrete configuration. Then, ρ fails iff it fails using472
only O-refreshing transitions.473
With the above, we can prove soundness.474
I Theorem 16 (Soundness). For any L, JLK fails iff JLKs fails.475
Proof. Lemma 14 implies that JLKs fails iff JLK fails with O-refreshing transitions, which in476
turns occurs iff JLK fails, by Lemma 15. J477
3.2 Bounded Analysis for Libraries478
Definition 12 states how the symbolic trace semantics can be used to independently check479
libraries for errors. As with the trace semantics in Definition 6, this is strongly normalising480
when given an upper limit to the call counters. As such, JLKs with counter bounds k0, l0 ∈ N,481
for k, l respectively, defines a finite set (modulo selecting of fresh names) of reachable valid482
configurations within k ≤ k0, l ≤ l0, where validity is defined by the satisfiability of the483
symbolic environment σ and the path condition pc of the configuration reached. By virtue of484
Theorems 9 and 16, every valid reachable configuration that is failed (evaluates an invalid485
assertion) is realisable by some client. And viceversa.486
Given a library L, taking FJLKs to be all reachable final configurations, we have the487
exhaustive set of paths L can reach. In FJLKs, every failed configuration (τ, ρ), i.e. such488
that ρ holds a term E[assert(0)], defines a reachable assertion violation, where τ is a true489
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l ≤ 1 l ≤ 2 l ≤ 3
k ≤ 2 226/70/45 (555s) 5708/60/44 (4710s) 9656/3/23 (12471s)
k ≤ 3 1254/67/51 (1475s) 4092/27/18 (13482s) 4187/17/12 (16649s)
k ≤ 4 3392/63/48 (3180s) 3069/19/14 (15903s) 1335/12/10 (17765s)
k ≤ 5 3659/57/45 (4787s) 895/15/10 (16757s) 215/11/9 (17796s)
a/b/c (d) for a traces found in b successful runs taking d seconds in total
where c out of 59 unsafe files were found to have bugs, per bound.
59 of 59 unsafe files found to have bugs over the various bounds checked
Table 1 Table recording performance of HOLiK on our benchmarks
counterexample. Hence, to check L for assertion violations it suffices to produce a finite490
representation of the set FJLKs. One approach is to bound the depth of analysis by setting an491
upper bound to the call counters, using a name generator to make deterministic the creation492
of fresh names, and then exhaustively search all final configurations for failed elements. In493
the following section we implement this routine and test it.494
4 Implementation and Experiments495
We implemented the syntax and symbolic trace semantics (symbolic games) for HOLi in496
the K semantic framework [33] as a proof of concept, and tested it on 70 sample libraries.1497
Using K’s option to exhaustively expand all transitions, K is able to build a closure of all498
applicable rules. By providing a bound on the call counters, we produce a finite set of all499
reachable valid symbolic configurations up to the given depth (equivalent to finding every500
valid ρ ∈ FJLKs) which thus implements our bounded symbolic execution.501
We wrote and adapted examples of coding errors into a set of 70 sample libraries written502
in HOLi, totalling 6,510 lines of code (LoC). Examples adapted from literature include:503
reentrancy bugs from smart contracts [3, 24]; variations of the “awkward example” [31];504
various programs from the MoCHi benchmark [36]; and simple implementations related to505
concurrent programming (e.g. flat combining and race conditions) where errors may occur506
in a single thread due to higher-order behaviour. We also combined several libraries, by507
concatenating refactored method and reference definitions, to generate larger libraries that508
are harder to solve. Combined files range from 150 to 520 LoC.509
We ran HOLiK on all sample libraries, lexicographically increasing the bounds from510
k ≤ 2, l ≤ 1 to k ≤ 5, l ≤ 3 (totalling 78,120 LoC checked), with a timeout set to five minutes511
per library. We start from k ≤ 2 because it provides the minimum nesting needed to observe512
higher-order semantics. All experiments ran on an Ubuntu 19.04 machine with 16GB RAM,513
Intel Core i7 3.40GHz CPU, with intermediate calls to Z3 to prune invalid configurations. Per514
bound, the number of counterexamples found, the time taken in seconds, and the execution515
status, i.e. whether it terminated or not, are recorded in Table 1.516
We can observe that independently increasing the bounds for k and l causes exponential517
growth in the total time taken, which is expected from symbolic execution. Note that the518
time tends towards 21000 seconds because of the timeout set to 5 minutes for 70 programs. In519
particular, while the number of errors found grows exponentially with respect to the increase520
1 The tool and its benchmarks can be found at: https://github.com/LaifsV1/HOLiK.
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in bounds – which is due to the exponential growth in paths – this trend does not continue521
indefinitely because programs start timing out without reporting any errors as the bounds522
grow. With bounds k ≤ 2 and l ≤ 1, all 70 programs in our benchmark were successfully523
analysed, though not all minimal errors were found until the bounds were increased further.524
Cumulatively, all unsafe programs in our benchmark were correctly identified.525
While the table may suggest that increasing bound for l is more beneficial than that526
for k, the number of errors reported does not imply every trace is useful. For instance,527
increasing the bound for l can lead to errors re-merging in a higher-order version, which528
suggests potential gain from a partial order reduction. Overall, the k and l counters are529
incomparable as they keep track of different behaviours. Finally, since HOLiK was able530
to handle every file and correctly identified all unsafe files in the benchmark, we conclude531
that HOLiK, as a proof of concept, captures the full range of behaviours in higher-order532
libraries. Results suggest that the tool scales up to at least medium-sized programs (<1000533
LoC), which is promising because real-world medium-size higher-order programs have been534
proven infeasible to check with standard techniques (e.g. the DAO withdraw contract was535
approximately 100 LoC).536
5 Related Work537
Game semantics techniques have been applied to program equivalence verification by reducing538
program equivalence to language equivalence in a decidable automata class [15, 1]. Equivalence539
tools can be used for reachability but, as they perform full verification, they can only cover540
lower-order recursion-free language fragments. For example, the Coneqct [25] tool can verify541
the simplified DAO attack, but cannot check higher-order or recursive functions (e.g. the542
“file lock” and “flat combiner” examples), and operates on integers concretely. Close to our543
approach is also Symbolic GameChecker [11], which performs symbolic model checking by544
using a representation of games based on symbolic finite-state automata. The tool works545
on recursion-free Idealized Algol with first-order functions, which supports only integer546
references. On the other hand, it is complete (not bounded) on the fragment that it covers.547
Besides games techniques, a recent line of work on verification of contracts in Racket548
[28, 27] is the work closest to ours. Racket contracts exist in a higher-order setting similar549
to ours, and generalise higher-order pre and post conditions, and thus specify safety. To550
verify these, [28] defines a symbolic execution based on what they call “demonic context” in551
prior work [39]. This either returns a symbolic value to a call, or performs a call to a known552
method within some unknown context, thus approximating all the possible higher-order553
behaviours, and is equivalent to the role the opponent plays in our games. In [27], the554
technique is extended to handle state, and finitised for total verification. The approaches555
are notionally similar to ours, since both amount to Symbolic Execution for an unknown556
environment. In substance, the techniques are very different and in particular ours is based557
on a semantics theory which allows us to obtain compositionality and definability results,558
which are not proven for [27] and proven for [28] only in a stateless setting. On the other559
hand, Racket contracts can be used for richer verification questions than assertion violations.560
In terms of tool performance, we provide a comparison of the techniques in Appendix B.561
Another relevant line of work is that of verifying programs in the Ethereum Platform.562
Smart contracts call for techniques that handle the environment, with a focus on reentrancy.563
Tools like Oyente [24] and Majan [29] use pre-defined patterns to find bugs in the transaction564
order, but are not sound or complete. ReGuard [23] finds sound reentrancy bugs using a565
fuzzing engine to generate random transactions to check with a reentrancy automaton. In566
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principle, it may detect reentrancy faster than symbolic execution (native execution is faster567
[41]), but, is incomplete even in a bounded setting. More closely related to our approach,568
[17] considers the possibility of an unknown contract c? calling a known contract c∗ at each569
higher call level. This can be generalised in our game semantics as abstract and public names570
calling each other, but their focus is on modelling reentrancy, while we handle the full range571
of higher-order behaviours.572
Like KLEE [4] and jCUTE [37], our implementation is a symbolic execution tool. These573
are generally able to find first-order counterexamples, but are unable to produce higher-order574
traces involving unknown code. Particularly, KLEE and jCUTE only handle symbolic calls575
provided these can be concretised. This partially models the environment, but calls are often576
impossible to concretise with libraries. The CBMC [6, 20] bounded model checking approach,577
which also bounds function application to a fixed depth, partially handle calls to unknown578
code by returning a non-deterministic value to such calls. This is equivalent to a game where579
only move available to the opponent is to answer questions. This restriction allows CBMC580
to find some bugs caused by interaction with the environment, but misses errors that arise581
from transferring flow of control (e.g. reentrancy). The typical BMC approach also misses582
bugs involving disclosure of names.583
Higher-order model checking tools like MoCHi [36] are also related. MoCHi model checks584
a pure subset of OCaml and is based on predicate abstraction and CEGAR and higher-order585
recursion scheme model checkers. The modular approach [35] further extends this idea586
with modular analysis that guesses refinement intersection types for each top-level function.587
Although generally incomparable, HOLiK covers program features that MoCHi does not:588
MoCHi does not handle references and support for open code is limited (from experiments,589
and private communication with the authors).590
6 Future Directions591
Observing errors resurface deeper in the trace suggests the possibility of defining a partial592
order for our semantics to obtain equivalence classes for configurations and thus eliminate593
paths that involve known errors [30, 40]. Additionally, while k and l successfully bound594
infinite behaviour, a notion of bounding can be arbitrarily chosen. In fact, while we chose to595
directly bound the sources of infinite behaviour in method calls for simplicity of proofs and596
implementation, the theory does not prevent the generalisation of k and l as a monotonic597
cost function that bounds the semantics. It may also be worth considering the elimination of598
bounds entirely for the sake of unbounded verification. For this, one direction is abstract599
interpretation [9, 8], which amounts to defining overapproximations for values in our language600
to then attempt to compute a fixpoint for the range of values that assertions may take.601
However, defining and using abstract domains that maintain enough precision to check higher-602
order behaviours, such as reentrancy, is not a simple extension of the theory. Another direction,603
similar to Coneqct [25], is to define a push-down system for our semantics. Particularly,604
the approach in [25] is based on the decidability of reachability in fresh-register pushdown605
automata, and would require overapproximations for methods and integers. As with abstract606
interpretation, this would require defining abstract domains for methods and integers. While607
methods could be approximated using a finite set of names, as with k-CFA [38], an extension608
using integer abstract domains would need refinement to tackle reentrancy attacks. Finally,609
MoCHi [36] shows that it is possible to use CEGAR and higher-order recursion schemes610
for unbounded verification of higher-order programs. However, an extension of the MoCHi611
approach to include references and open code is not obvious.612
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A Motivating examples760
Our file lock example provides a scenario where the library makes it possible for the client to761
update a file without first reacquiring the lock for it. The library contains an empty private762
method updateFile that simulates file access. The library also provides a public method763
openFile, which locks the file, allows the user to update the file indirectly, and then releases764
the lock.765
766
1 import userExec :(( unit → unit) → unit)767
2 int lock := 0;768
3 private updateFile(x:unit) :(unit) = { () };769
4 public openFile (u:unit) :(unit) = {770
5 if (!lock) then ()771
6 else (lock := 1;772
7 let write = fun(x:unit ):( unit) → (assert (!lock); updateFile ())773
8 in userExec(write); lock := 0) };774
775
The bug here is that openFile creates a write method, which it then passes to the client,776
via userExec(write), to use whenever they want. This provides the client indirect access to777
the private method updateFile, which it can call without first acquiring the lock. Running778
this example in HOLiK we obtain the following minimal trace:779
call〈openFile, ()〉 · call〈userExec,m2〉 · ret〈userExec, ()〉780
· ret〈openFile, ()〉 · call〈m2, ()〉781782
where m2 is the method name generated by the library and bound to the variable write.783
This example serves as a representative of a class of bugs caused by revealing methods to784
the environment, a higher-order problem, in this case involving the second-order method785
userExec revealing m2.786
Next, we simulate double deallocation using a global reference addr as the memory787
address. The library defines private methods alloc and free to simulate allocation and788
freeing. The empty private method doSthing serves as a placeholder for internal computation789
that does not free memory.790
791
1 import getInput :(unit → int)792
2 int addr := 0; // 0 means address is free793
3 private alloc (u:unit) :(unit) = {794
4 if not(!addr) then addr := 1 else () };795
5 private free (u:unit) :(unit) = {796
6 assert (!addr); addr := 0 };797
7 private doSthing (i:int) :(unit) = { () };798
8 public run (u:unit) :(unit) = {799
9 alloc (); doSthing(getInput ()); free() };800
801
The error occurs in line 9, which calls the client method getInput. This passes control to802
the client, who can now call run again, thus causing free to be called twice. Executing the803
example on HOLiK, we obtain the following trace:804
call〈run, ()〉 · call〈getInput, ()〉 · call〈run, ()〉 · call〈getInput, ()〉805
· ret〈getInput, x1〉 · ret〈run, ()〉 · ret〈getInput, x2〉806807
As with the DAO attack, this is a reentrancy bug.808
Finally, we have an unsafe implementation of a flat combiner. The library defines two809
public methods: enlist, which allows the client to add procedures to be executed by the810
Lin et al. 28:21
library, and run, which lets the client run all procedures added so far. The higher-order811
global reference list implements a list of methods.812
813
1 private empty(x:int) : (unit) = { () };814
2 fun list := empty;815
3 int cnt := 0; int running := 0;816
4 public enlist(f:(unit → unit)) :(unit) = {817
5 if (! running) then ()818
6 else819
7 cnt := !cnt + 1;820
8 (let c = !cnt in let l = !list in821
9 list := (fun(z:int):( unit) → if (z == c) then f() else l(z)))};822
10 public run(x:unit) :(unit) = {823
11 running := 1;824
12 if (0 < !cnt) then825
13 (!list )(!cnt);826
14 cnt := !cnt - 1; assert(not (!cnt < 0)); run()827
15 else (list := empty; running := 0) };828
829
The bug here is also due to a reentrant call in line 13. However, this is a much tougher830
example as it involves a higher-order reference list, a recursive method run, and a second-831
order method enlist that reveals client names to the library. With HOLiK, we obtain the832
following minimal counterexample:833
call〈enlist,m1〉 · ret〈enlist, ()〉 · call〈run, ()〉 · call〈m1, ()〉834
· call〈run, ()〉 · call〈m1, ()〉 · ret〈m1, ()〉 · ret〈run, ()〉 · ret〈m1, ()〉835836
where m1 is a client name revealed to the library. In the trace above, enlist reveals the837
method m1 to the library. This name is then added to the list of procedures to execute. In838
run, the library passes control to the client by calling m1. At this point, the client is allowed839
to call run again before the list is updated.840
B Comparison with Racket Contract Verification841
We shall consider the latest version of the tool [27] since it handles state, which we refer to as842
SCV (Software Contract Verifier). A small benchmark (19 programs) based on HOLiK and843
SCV benchmarks was used for testing. Programs were manually translated between HOLi and844
Racket. Care was taken to translate programs whilst maintaining their semantics: contracts845
enforcing an input-output relation were translated into HOLi using wrapper functions that846
define the relation through an if statement. In the other direction, since contracts do not847
directly access references inside a term, stateful functions were translated from HOLi to848
return any references we wish to reason about.849
Table 2 records the comparison. On one hand, HOLiK only found real errors, whereas850
SCV reported several spurious errors–a third of all errors were spurious. On the other851
hand, SCV was able to prove total correctness of 3 of the 7 safe files present. SCV also852
scales much better than HOLiK with respect to program size, which is in exchange of853
precision. The difference in time for small programs is mainly due to initialisation time.854
Subtle differences in the nature of each tool can also be observed. e.g., HOLiK reports 1 real855
error for ack-simple-e, whereas SCV reports 2 errors. The difference is because SCV takes856
into account constraints for integers (e.g. > 0 and = 0). More interestingly, for various,857
HOLiK reports 19 ways to reach assertion violations, whereas SCV reports only 6 real ways858
to violate contracts. The difference is because HOLiK reports paths through the execution859
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Program LoC Traces Time (s) LoC Errors Time (s) False Errors
ack 17 0 6.0 9 N/A 2.4 N/A
ack-simple 13 0 6.5 9 0 2.4 0
ack-simple-e 13 1 6.5 9 2 2.5 0
dao 10 0 5.0 15 1 2.6 1
dao-e 16 1 5.5 15 1 2.7 0
dao-various 85 5 22.5 122 10 3.0 5
dao2-e 85 10 23.5 122 10 2.9 0
escape 9 0 5.0 9 0 2.6 0
escape-e 9 2 5.0 10 1 2.7 0
escape2-e 10 14 6.0 10 1 2.7 0
factorial 10 0 5.0 9 0 2.2 0
mc91 12 0 5.0 9 1 2.2 1
mc91-e 12 1 5.0 8 1 2.4 0
mult 14 0 5.0 11 2 2.7 2
mult-e 14 1 5.0 11 2 2.4 0
succ 7 0 5.0 7 1 2.5 1
succ-e 7 1 5.0 7 1 2.8 0
various 116 19 14.0 108 11 6.2 5
total 459 55 140.5 500 45 49.8 15
Table 2 Comparison of HOLiK (left) and SCV (right). N/A is recorded for ack as in our attempts
SCV crashed due to unknown reasons.
tree that reach errors, whereas SCV reports a set of terms that may violate the contracts. For860
instance, independently safe methods A and B that may call an unsafe method C would be,861
from testing, reported as three valid traces (call〈A〉 · call〈C〉, call〈B〉 · call〈C〉 and call〈C〉)862
by HOLiK. In contrast, SCV reports a single contract violation blaming C. Finally, ack863
failed to run on SCV due to unknown errors; Racket reported an error internal to the tool.864
Further testing proved the file is a valid Racket program that can be executed manually.865
C ML-like References866
HOLi has global higher-order references. These are enough for coding all of our examples867
and, moreover, allow us to prove completeness (every error has a realising client). We here868
present a sketch of how games can be extended with (locally created, scope extruding)869
ML-like references, following e.g. [21, 16]. First, the following extension to types and terms870
are required.871
θ ::= · · · | ref θ M ::= · · · | !M | ref M |M = M v ::= · · · | r872
873
The term !M allows dereferencing terms M which evaluate to references, while ref v creates874
dynamically a fresh name r ∈ Refsθ (if v : θ), and the semantic purpose is to update the875
store S unionmulti {r 7→ v} when evaluating ref v. Note that this allows us to store references to876
references, etc. Finally, the construct M = M is for comparing references for name equality.877
With terms handling general references concretely and symbolically, we extend game878
configurations with sets Lp,Lo ⊆ Refs that keep track of reference names disclosed by the879
proponent and opponent respectively. References being passed as values means that the880
client can update the references belonging to the client, and viceversa. When making a move,881
for each reference r they own that is passed, the proponent adds r to Lp. Passing of names in882
a move can be done either by method argument and return value, but also via the common883
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1 g l o b a l cnt := 0
2 g l o b a l meth := 0
3 g l o b a l r e f i := mi # for each mi ∈ P
4 g l o b a l r e f i := d e f v a l # for each mi ∈ P ′
5 g l o b a l va l θ := d e f v a l # for each θ ∈ Θv
6 pub l i c mi = λx . # for each mi ∈ A
7 cnt++; meth:= i ; va l θ1 :=x ; o r a c l e ( )
8 mi = λx . # for each mi ∈ A′
9 cnt++; meth:= i ; va l θ1 :=x ; o r a c l e ( )
10 o r a c l e = λ ( ) .
11 match ( ! cnt ) with # number of P-moves played so far (max |τ |/2)
12 | i →
13 # if i > 0 and i-th P-move of τ is crmj(v), with mj : θ1 → θ2, then
14 # - if cr = ret then d = 0 and θ = θ2
15 # - if cr = call then d = j and θ = θ1
16 # diverge if the last P-move played is different from crmj(v)
17 i f not ( ! meth = d and ! va l θ
∧=θ v ) then d ive rge
18 e l s e f o r mi i n fresh ( ! va l θ ) do r e f i := mi
19 # if (i+ 1)-th O-move of τ is cr′mk(u), with mk : θ1 → θ2, then
20 # - if cr′ = ret then c = 0
21 # - if cr′ = call then c = k
22 i f c then l e t x = ( ! r e f k )u i n # call mk(u)
23 cnt++; meth :=0; va l θ2 :=x ; o r a c l e ( ) ; ! va l θ2
24 e l s e va l θ2 :=u # return u
25 main = o r a c l e ( )
Figure 5 The client Cτ,P,A.
part of the store (i.e. via the references known to both players). Similarly, opponent passes884
names in their moves, which are added to Lo. Concretely, when the opponent passes control,885
all references in Lp are updated with opponent values. Symbolically, the references r are886
updated with distinct fresh symbolic integers κ if r ∈ RefsInt, distinct fresh method names887
if r ∈ Refsθ1→θ2 , or to arbitrary reference names if r ∈ RefsRefsθ .888
D Definability889
In this section we show that every trace τ in the semantics of a library L has a corresponding890
good client that realises the same trace in its semantics.891
Let L be a library with public names P and abstract names A. Given a trace τ produced892
by L, with P ′ and A′ respectively the public and abstract names introduced in τ , we set:893
N = P ∪ P ′ ∪ A ∪A′894
Θv = {θ | ∃m ∈ N . m : θ′ ∧ θ a syntactic subtype of θ′}895
Θm = {θ ∈ Θ | θ a method type}896897
Note that the above sets are finite, since τ,P,A are finite. We assume a fixed enumeration of898
N = {m1,m2, · · · ,mn}. Moreover, for each type θ, we let defvalθ be a default value, and899
divergeθ a term that on evaluation diverges by infinite recursion. We then construct a client900
Cτ,P,A as in Figure 5.901
The code is structured as follows.902
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1. We start off by defining global references:903
cnt counts the number of P (Library) moves played so far;904
meth stores an index that records the move made by P: if the move was a return then905
meth stores 0; if it was call to mi then meth stores i;906
each refi will store the method mi ∈ P ∪ P ′, either since the beginning (if mi ∈ P),907
or once P plays it (if mi ∈ P ′);908
each valθ will be used for storing the value played by P in their last move.909
In the latter case above, there is a light abuse of syntax as θ can be a product type, of910
which HOLi does not have references. But we can in fact simulate references of arbitrary911
type by several HOLi references.912
2. For each mi : θ1 → θ2 ∈ A, we define a public method mi that simulates the behaviour913
of O whenever mi is called in τ :914
it starts by increasing cnt, as a call to mi corresponds to a P-move being played;915
it continues by storing i and x in meth and valθ1 respectively;916
it calls the private method oracle, which is tasked with simulating the rest of τ and917
storing the value that mi will return in valθ2 ;918
it returns the value in valθ2 .919
3. For each mi : θ1 → θ2 ∈ A′ we produce a method just like above, but keep it private (for920
the time being).921
4. The method oracle performs the bulk of the computations, by checking that the last922
move played by P was the expected one and selecting the next move to play (and playing923
it if is a call).924
The oracle is called after each P-move is played, so it starts with increasing cnt.925
It then performs a case analysis on the value of cnt, which above we denote collectively926
by assuming the value is i – this notation hides the fact that we have one case for each927
of the finitely many values of i.928
For each such i, the oracle first checks if the previous P-move (if there was one), was929
the expected one. If the move was a call, it checks whether the called method was930
the expected one (via an appropriate value of d), and also whether the value was the931
expected one. Value comparisons (
∧=θ) only compare the integer components of θ, since932
we cannot compare method names. If this check is successful, the oracle extracts from933
u any method names played fresh by P and stores them in the corresponding refi.934
Next, the oracle prepares the next move. If, for the given i, the next move is a call,935
then the oracle issues the call, stores the return value of that call, increases cnt and936
recurs to itself – when the issued call returns, it would be through a P-move. If, on the937
other hand, the next move is a return, the oracle simply stores the value to be returned938
in the respective val reference – this would allow to the respective mi to return that939
value.940
5. The main method simply calls the oracle.941
We can then show the following (proof provided in full version [22]). For any library L942
and (τ, ρ) ∈ JLK, Cτ is such that (τ, ρ′) ∈ JCτ K for some ρ′.943
